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THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE: AN ENIGMA IN
A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY
BIRCH BAYH*
The difficulty of finding an unexceptionable process
for appointing the Executive Organ of a Government such
as that of the United States, was deeply felt by the Con-
vention; and as the final arrangement took place in the
latter stages of the session, influence produced by fatigue
and impatience in all such bodies; tho' the degree was
much less than usually prevails in them.'
INTRODUCTION
We have had 190 years to find exception with the "ar-
rangment" for electing a President and Vice-President which the
Constitutional Convention created in its last weary days. The
scheme on which the delegates finally agreed, the electoral college,
was struck as a compromise between the proponents for a direct
election by the people and those who favored election by the United
States Congress. In the words of historian John Roche, the electoral
college "was merely a jerry-rigged improvisation which has subse-
quently been endowed with a high theoretical content . . . . The
future was left to cope with the problem of what to do with this
Rube Goldberg mechanism."'
Over 500 constitutional amendments have been offered in Con-
gress to simplify and correct the weaknesses which soon became ap-
parent in the electoral college. Only the twelfth amendment, passed
in 1803 and ratified in 1804, has effected any major revision. Efforts
to effect change were intensified by the close elections of 1960, 1968,
and 1976, and by the continuing democratization' of American
*Senior United States Senator from Indiana.
1. Letter from James Madison to George Hay, August 23, 1823, reprinted in 3
M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787 458
(1937) [hereinafter cited as FARRAND].
2. Roche, The Founding Fathers: A Reform Caucus in Action, 55 AM. POL.
Sci. REV. 799, 810 (1961).
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political institutions.3 Hearings on reform of the electoral college
have been held before the Senate Judiciary Committees since 1952.
In contending that a system of direct election would provide
United States voters with a more meaningful exercise of their fran-
chise, this article highlights existing shortcomings in the electoral
college system and rebuts the arguments which have been put forth
by opponents of the direct election method.
DEFECTS OF THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE
The electoral college system has three principal faults:
(1) It permits election of a President and Vice-President who
have received fewer popular votes than their opponents. That has
occurred three times in our history: 1824, 1876 and 1888. It almost
happened in 1976.
(2) All votes do not count the same. Under the unit rule a
President can be elected by carrying the eleven largest electoral
vote states by slim margins, even though losing all other states and
the nationwide vote by a landslide. Also, all votes for the candidate
who loses a state are cast for the candidate who wins the state.
(3) The American people do not actually cast the votes which
elect their President; the electors do. These electors are free to
disregard the preference of the voters who chose them and cast
their electoral votes for anyone. George Mason, one of the delegates
to the Constitutional Convention, perceived the delusion of the elec-
toral college. He stated that the elector system "was a mere decep-
tion-a mere ignis fatuus on the American people-and thrown out
to make them believe they were to choose" the President.'
There are four features of the electoral college as it operates
today which illustrate these defects.
Faithless Electors
The founding fathers envisioned a congregation of "men most
capable of analyzing the qualities adopted to the station, and acting
under circumstances favorable to deliberation, and to a judicious
combination of all the reasons and inducements which were proper
to govern their choice" as Alexander Hamilton explained in Number
68 of the Federalist Papers. Because of this requisite wisdom, the
Constitution of necessity left the electors independent.
3. See R. Claude, Nationalism of the Electoral Process, 6 HARV. J. LEGIS. 139
(1969).
4. 3 FARRAND at 492.
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Our legacy from this provision has found wisdom irrelevant
and consternation universal when the elector exercises his indepen-
dent thought. As early as 1796 an irate voter wrote in the United
States Gazette: "What, do I chuse Samual Miles to determine for me
whether John Adams or Thomas Jefferson shall be President? No! I
chuse him to act, not to think."5
The potential for danger from the faithless elector remains to-
day. In January, 1969, Congress confirmed this 18th century
prerogative by accepting the vote of a popularly chosen Republican
elector from North Carolina who had cast his vote in the electoral
college for George Wallace, the American Independent Party can-
didate. Again in 1973, a Republican elector from Virginia was allow-
ed to cast his vote for one Dr. John Hospers of the Liberation Party.
Mike Padden from Washington cast his vote for his personal choice,
Mr. Reagan, in the last election.
In 1976, if about 5,560 votes had switched from Carter to Ford
in Ohio, Carter would have lost the state, and the electoral vote
would have stood at 272, only two more than the minimum needed
of 270. Two or three individual electors could conceivably have been
persuaded to withhold their electoral votes or even change them,
and thus make the outcome very uncertain.
The Unit Rule
The most dangerous of the defects of the electoral college is
the winner-take-all or unit rule. A consequence of the unit rule is
that it discourages the minority in a one-party state. Where there is
no hope of carrying a state, there is little reason for the members of
the losing party to turn out. The majority party on the other hand
also has little incentive to increase its turnout. This certainly ac-
counts in part for the poor voter participation in the United States.
Perhaps most importantly, the unit rule means that all votes
are not equally important. A voter in Indiana, for example, has an
opportunity to swing 13 electoral votes; a voter in New York can
theoretically produce 41. The consequence of this factor is to inflate
the voting power of voters in the handful of large, closely contested
states where blocs of electoral votes can be won on the basis of nar-
row popular vote margin.
The winner-take-all rule also empowers third-party candidates
to swing elections when they can gather votes in large, closely
balanced states. For example, Eugene McCarthy in 1976, with less
5. E. STANWOOD, A HISTORY OF THE PRESIDENCY FROM 1788 To 1897 51 (1898).
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than 1% of the popular vote, came close to tilting the election
through his strength in close pivotal states. In four states-Iowa,
Maine, Oklahoma and Oregon, totaling 26 electoral votes-McCar-
thy's vote exceeded the margin by which Ford defeated Carter. In
those states, McCarthy's candidacy may have swung those states to
Carter. Even more significantly, had McCarthy been on the New
York ballot, it is likely Ford would have carried that state with its
41 electoral votes, and with it the election-despite Carter's na-
tional vote majority.'
Constant Two Votes
The third election feature of the electoral college which il-
lustrates its defects is the constant two electoral votes apportioned
to each state regardless of state size. Obviously, voters in very
small states wield something of a disproportionate influence when
their state population might not otherwise allow them two votes.
Traditionally hailed as a significant advantage to the smallest states,
the effect of the unit rule more than overcomes this advantage, as
will be discussed later.7
Contingency Plan
Finally, the contigency feature of the electoral college provides
that in event of less than a majority in electoral vote, the top three
candidates will be voted on by the House of Representatives. The
members of the Constitutional Convention felt that "19 times out of
20" the election would devolve onto the Congress.8 It is only for-
tunate for the country that this has not turned out to be the case.
In recent years, the danger has been only too real. For exam-
ple, in 1960, a switch of less than 9,000 popular votes from Kennedy
to Nixon in Illinois and Missouri would have prevented either man
from receiving an electoral college majority. Similarly, in 1968, a
53,000 vote shift in New Jersey, Missouri, and New Hampshire,
would have resulted in an electoral college deadlock, with Nixon
6. Hearings on S.J.Res.1, Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amend-
ments, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., (Feb. 1, 1977) (statement of Lawrence Longley, Assistant
Professor at Lawerence University). In four states, Iowa, Maine, Oklahoma, and
Oregon, totaling 26 electoral votes, McCarthy's vote exceeded the margin by which
Ford defeated Carter. In those states, McCarthy's candidacy may have swung those
states to Carter. Even more significantly, had McCarthy been on the New York ballot,
it is likely that Ford would have carried that state with its 41 electoral votes, and with
it the election-despite Carter's national vote majority.
7. See notes 12-14 infra and accompanying text.
8. 2 FARRAND 501 (statement of George Mason).
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receiving 269 votes; one short of a majority. Finally, in the 1976
election, if some 11,950 votes in Delaware and Ohio had gone from
Carter to Ford, Ford wold have carried these two states. The result
would then have been an exact tie in electoral votes; 269-269. The
Presidency would have been decided not on election night, but
through deals or switches by electoral college members, or in the
political uncertainty of the House of Representatives.
The present electoral college system is an archaic system, one
that contains the potential for many undemocratic resolutions of
Presidential elections. These undemocratic tendencies must force us
to question its value and seek better, more democratic systems of
election.
DIRECT ELECTION
One electoral system which would remedy the structural
defects inherent in the electoral college is election by direct popular
vote. Although a variety of alternative plans has been presented,
the major initiatives for reform have come from those who seek to
replace the present system with direct election. Proponents of direct
election have just recently begun a renewed effort in Congress to do
away with the electoral college. Senate Joint Resolution 1, as
amended, was passed by the House of Representatives in September
1969. It was made the pending order of business in the Senate in
September, 1970, but two attempts to limit floor debate by invoking
cloture failed, and on October 5, the Senate agreed to a unanimous
consent request of Senator Mansfield to return Senate Joint Resolu-
tion 1 to the calendar. No further action was taken.' There may
9. As set out in unpublished Report of the Subcommittee on Constitutional
Amendments in 1975, the major provisions of the proposed direct election amendment
are the following:
The resolution contains the customary provisions that the proposed
new article to the Constitution shall be valid as part of the Constitution
only if ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the States within 7
years after it has been submitted to them by the Congress.
Section 1 of the proposed article would abolish the electoral college
system of electing the President and Vice-President of the United States
and provide for their election by direct popular vote. The people of every
State and the District of Columbia would vote directly for President and
Vice-President. This section prevents a candidate for either office from
being paired with more than one other person. Candidates must consent
to run jointly.
Section 2 provides that voters for President and Vice-President in
each State must meet the qualifications for voting for the most numerous
branch of the State legislature in that State. The term "electors" is re-
tained, but instead of referring to the electoral college, the term
1977]
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henceforth means qualified voters, as it does in existing provisions deal-
ing with popular election of members of Congress. This clause also per-
mits the legislature of any State to prescribe less restrictive residence re-
quirements and is necessary in order to prevent invalidation of relaxed
residence requirements already or hereafter adopted by the States for
voting in presidential elections.
The Congress is also empowered to establish uniform residence
qualifications. This authority would in no way affect the provisions deal-
ing with residency requirements in presidential elections adopted as part
of the proposed Voting Rights Act of 1970. The Voting Rights Act would
abolish residency requirements for voting in presidential elections and
establishes nationwide, uniform standards relating to absentee registra-
tion and absentee voting in presidential elections. This provision,
moreover, does not modify or limit in anyway existing constitutional
powers of the Congress to legislate on the subject of voting qualifications.
The District of Columbia is not referred to in section 2 because Congress
now possesses the legislative power to establish voting qualifications for
the District under article 1, section 8, clauses 17 and 18.
Section 2 is modeled after the provisions of article 1, section 2, and
the 17th amendment to the Constitution regarding the qualifications of
those voting for Members of Congress. As a result, general uniformity
within each State regarding the qualifications for voting for all elected
Federal officials is retained. Use of the expression "Electors of the most
numerous branch of the State legislature" does not nullify by implication
or intent the provisions of the 24th amendment that bar payment of a poll
tax or any other tax as a requisite for voting in Federal elections. The
Supreme Court, moreover, has held that a poll tax may not be enacted as
a requisite for voting in Federal elections. The Supreme Court, moreover,
has held that a poll tax may not be enacted as a requisite for voting in
State elections as well. Harper v. Board of Supervisors, 383 U.S. 663,
(1966).
Section 3 requires that candidates obtain at least 40 percent of the
whole number of votes cast to be elected President and Vice-President.
The expression "whole number of votes cast" refers to all valid votes
counted in the final tally. The term "whole number" is consistent with
prior expressions in the Constitution, as in the 12th amendment. Section 3
further provides that if no pair of persons receives at least 40 percent of
the whole number of votes cast for President and Vice-President, a
popular runoff will be held among the two pairs of persons who receive
the highest number of votes.
Section 4 embodies provisions imposing duties upon the Congress
and the States in regard to the conduct of elections. The first part of this
section requires the State legislatures to prescribe the times, places, and
manner of holding presidential elections and entitlement to inclusion on
the ballot-subject to a reserve power in Congress to make or alter such
regulations. This provision is modeled after similar provisions in article 1
and the 17th amendment dealing with elections of members of Congress.
States will continue to have the primary responsibility for regulating the
ballot. However, if a State sought to exclude a major party candidate
from appearing on the ballot-as happened in 1948 and 1964-the Con-
gress would be empowered to deal with such a situation.
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never have been a measure before Congress which has been more
fully debated than direct election. Hearings on electoral reform go
back to 1952, and hundreds of hours of testimony have been heard.
The questions arising from the proposed direct election amendment
have been extensively studied and commented on by many in-
dividuals, from many perspectives. Each objection raised by op-
ponents can be effectively and convincingly countered.
Direct Election Will Not Weaken Our System Of Federalism
Perhaps the most frequent argument made by opponents of
direct election is that the electoral college is an important compo-
Section 4 also requires Congress to establish by statute the days
for the regular election and any runoff election, which must be uniform
throughout the United States. This conforms to the present constitutional
requirement for electoral voting (article 11, section 1), to which Congress
has responded by establishing a uniform day for the election of electors (3
U.S.C. 1).
Section 4 further requires Congress to prescribe the time, place,
and manner in which the results of such election shall be ascertained and
declared. The mandatory language is comparable to the mandatory duties
imposed upon the States to provide popular election machinery for
Members of Congress. In implementing this section, Congress may choose
to accept State certifications of the popular vote as it now accepts elec-
toral vote certifications under the provisions of 3 U.S.C. 15. Federal
enabling legislation will be required to provide the specific legislative
details contemplated in the broad constitutional language of the amend-
ment.
Section 5 empowers Congress to provide by legislation for the
death, inability, or withdrawl of any candidate for President and Vice-
President either before or after a regular runoff election, but before a
President or Vice-President has been elected. Once a President and Vice-
President have been elected, existing constitutional provisions would app-
ly. Thus, the death of the President-elect would be governed by the 20th
amendment and the death of the Vice-President-elect would be governed
by the procedure for filling a Vice-Presidential vacancy contained in the
25th amendment. Section 5 also empowers the Congress to provide by
legislation for the case of the death of the President-elect and Vice-
President-elect.
Section 6 confers on Congress the power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation. The power conferred upon Congress by this sec-
tion parallels the reserve power granted to the Congress by numerous
amendments to the Constitution. Any exercise of power under this sec-
tion must not only be "appropriate" to the effectuation of the article but
must also be consistent with the Constitution.
Section 6 provides that the article shall take effect one year after
ratification. Since State and Federal legislation will be necessary to fully
implement and effectuate the purposes of the proposed amendment, a
reasonable period of time should be provided between the date of ratifica-
tion and the date on which the amendment is to take effect.
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nent in preserving the power of the states in our federal system.
Even at the Constitutional Convention, however, the electoral col-
lege was not intended to serve that purpose. The electoral college
was effected primarily as a compromise between advocates of
popular election such as James Madison, James Wilson and
Gouverneur Morris and those who wanted the executive chosen by
the legislative branch.
In addition to its role as a tool of compromise, the electoral col-
lege concept also served to ameliorate several other extraneous wor-
ries prevalent at the Convention. It reduced, for example, the fear
that legislative election would involve cabal, corruption and possible
foreign influence. The inconvenience and hazards of travel argued
for decentralized voting. The manner of choosing the President was
debated sporadically over the summer of 1787, and resolved finally
by the contrivance of an appointed Committee of Eleven in the early
days of September as a matter of practical politics." A highly
restricted franchise was broadly acceptable in 1787, and few quibbled
with the principle that a small sample of learned men were entitled
to act as surrogates for the larger mass in the selection of an ex-
ecutive. This worked well as an arbitration device in 1787 but quick-
ly diminshed in utility thereafter."
It is clear that the well-known Great Compromise between
large and small states was not a major factor in shaping the elec-
toral college.
The Great Compromise was devised to settle the
dispute over representation in Congress, not the electoral
college. It was presented to the Convention on July 5,
1787, and constituted the agreement that made the
Federal Union possible. Today it represents a central
pillar of the American federal system which few men have
seriously suggested disturbing . . .At no point in the
minutes of the Convention can one find any reference to
the application of the Great Compromise to the electoral
10. See J. Feerick, The Electoral College: Why It Was Created, 54 AM. BAR
J. 294 (1968). The manner of choosing the President was debated sporadically over the
summer of 1787, and resolved finally by the contrivance of an appointed Committee of
Eleven in the early days of September as a matter of practical politics.
11. As early as the first election in 1789, two problems were apparent: First,
the manner of choosing electors was unclear; second, "double balloting," or two votes
cast by each elector for President, meant that there was no distinction made for
preference for President and Vice-President. See N. PEIRCE, THE PEOPLE'S PRESIDENT
58-78 (1968) [hereinafter cited as PEIRCE].
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college's apportionment as important to the federal
system or to the overall structure of the Constitution
which was adopted. Indeed, it was never mentioned
directly at all. Only in The Federalist Papers, where
James Madison argued at one point that the electoral base
for the Presidency would be a "compound" of national and
state factors because of the mixed apportionment base,
does the argument appear. But no more than indirect
reference was made to the apportionment of the electoral
college in the states ratifying conventions, or in fact by
any of the nation's leaders until some years after ratifica-
tion of the Constitution. The argument that the founding
fathers viewed the special federal nature of electoral col-
lege apportionment as central to the institution of the
Presidency, or to the entire Constitution, is simply false.
The small states thought they would gain special advan-
tage, but by another provision-their equal votes in the
House in contingent elections. 2
The question of whether the small states have in fact been
favored by the electoral college system is one which is still hotly
debated, although the growing weight of evidence points une-
quivocally to the conclusion that any advantage accruing to the
small states by virtue of the initial two votes is soon dissipated by
virtue of the effect of the unit rule. In other words, the potential
which any voter in a large electoral vote state such as New York,
has to affect the outcome of the election, easily outweighs the sim-
ple mathematical disadvantage of having more voters per number of
electoral college members than would have a voter in one of the
smallest states. This conclusion, reached by electoral scholars in the
1960's,"3 has been buttressed and documented by empirical analyses
of political scientists and economists in the 1970's.4
12. PEIRCE at 261-262.
1 3. If a voter finds he is in the minority in his state under the prevail-
ing general ticket system, then he knows his vote will be completely
negated in the national electoral vote count. His state may have enjoyed
some theoretical right-and in fact cast an electoral vote several times
over its actual right by population-but for the individual on the losing
side, the alleged "right" is an empty one indeed.
PEIRCE at 264.
14. See L. LONGLEY & A. BRAUN. THE POLITICS OF ELECTORAL REFORM (2d ed.
1975); J. YUNKER & L. LONGLEY, THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE: ITS BIASES NEWLY
MEASURED FOR THE 1960's AND 1970's (1976); Banzhof, One Man, 3.312 Votes: A
Mathematical Analysis of the Electoral College, 13 VILL. L. REV. 303 (1968); Blair,
Electoral College Reform and the Distribution of Voting Power, 4 and 19 (Nov. 1976)
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Perhaps the best answer that can be given to the questions
which arise under the name of federalism is that of Senator Mike
Mansfield in 1961:
[T]he Federal system is not strengthened through an
antiquated device which has not worked as it was intend-
ed to work when it was included in the Constitution and
which, if anything, has become a divisive force in the
Federal system by pitting groups of States against groups
of States. As I see the Federal system in contemporary
practice, the House of Representatives is the key to the
protection of district interests as district interests, just as
the Senate is the key to the protection of State interests
as State interests. These instrumentalities, and particular-
ly the Senate, are the principal constitutional safeguards
of the Federal system, but the Presidency has evolved,
out of necessity, into the principal political office, as the
courts have become the principal legal bulwark beyond
districts, beyond States, for safeguarding the interests of
all the people in all the States. And since such is the case,
in my opinion, the Presidency should be subject to the
direct and equal control of all the people.15
Direct Election Will Not Encourage Fraud
According to the Minority Report from the Committee on the
Judiciary in 1970, "One of the most calamitous and probable conse-
quences of direct popular election will be the increased incidence of
election fraud.""6 The argument is that if fraud occurs under the pre-
sent system, the impact is limited to determining the outcome in one
state alone. "The incentive to steal votes is now restricted to close
contests in States which have a sufficiently large electoral vote to
alter the final result. Thus, fraud can be profitable only in a few
states, and is seldom capable of affecting the national outcome." 17
In reality, the incentive to steal votes "now" as described
above is a fair argument for why the electoral college system itself
encourages fraud. A relatively few irregular votes can reap a
healthy reward in the form of a bloc of electoral votes, because of
(unpublished study at the Wharton School, Department of Economics, University of
Pennsylvania).
15. 107 CONG. REc. 350 (1961).
16. COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, DIRECT POPULAR ELECTION OF THE PRESI.
DENT, S. Rep. No. 91-1123, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. 42 (1970).
17. Id.
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the unit rule. In short, under the present system, fraudulent popular
votes are likely to have a greater impact than a like number of
fraudulent popular votes under direct election. This is especially
true in the larger states. In New York, cries of voting irregularities
arose on election night, 1976. At stake were 41 electoral
votes-more than enough to elect Ford over Carter in the electoral
college. Carter's popular margin was 290,000. The calls for recount
were eventually dropped, but if fraud had been present in New
York, Carter's plurality of 290,000 would have been enough to deter-
mine the outcome of the election. Under direct election, at least 1.7
million votes, Carter's national margin, would have had to be ir-
regular to affect the outcome.
Opponents of direct election charge that a popular vote would
increase the incentive for fraud because in a close election every
vote would count. It is precisely for this reason that we would have
better policing of the polling places by the parties themselves, and
possibly even better counting methods and procedural safeguards.
The kinds of fraud and voting irregularities which have occurred
under the electoral college are frequently in places controlled by
one party. And under the electoral college system, there is no incen-
tive for the other party to watch the polls when there is no possibili-
ty of carrying the entire state and hence, its electoral votes.
Direct Election Will Not Encourage Recounts
Critics of direct election have urged that this reform would
result in a much higher frequency of recounts and challenges, and
that the delays caused would be interminable. T.H. White has spoken
of the prospect as a "nightmare". 8 Such arguments ignore the dangers
which now exist under the electoral college, and exaggerate the
dangers which might arise under direct election.
A disgrunted candidate is more inclined to insist upon a re-
count when and if he perceives that it may change the results of the
election in his favor. This is more likely with the electoral college
system than with direct election. As the present system magnifies
the temptation for voter fraud, it magnifies the liklihood of recounts:
it places too much premium on a close race in a small number of key
states. L. Kinvin Wroth testified before the Subcommittee on Con-
stitutional Amendments on February 1, 1977:
It is sometimes said that the effect of a direct elec-
tion procedure would be to encourage contests in every
18. Id. at 44.
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precinct. Exactly the converse seems true. Contests are
most fruitful to the challenger in a situation like that of
1976 where, under the winner-take-all system, the rever-
sal of one large state's result would mean the capture of
the electoral college. Under a direct election system,
President Carter would have had to have lost far more
than a few thousand votes in New York and Ohio to lose
the election.
Furthermore, experience shows that actual state-wide recounts
reveal an almost minisucle shift in the number and percent of
votes.19
Except in a case of truly massive fraud, the chances
of success are rendered greatly uncertain by the common
tendency in such proceedings for errors on both sides to
cancel each other out. In the unusual case where a contest
is both practical and successful, the winner of a contested
direct election, who has changed the result of the national
popular vote in his favor, will stand in a far better
political position than would a winner under the present
19. The table below gives a breakdown of five major statewide recounts during
the 1960's.
Election Total Initial Final Vote %
votes margin margin shift shift
Hawaii Pres, 1960
(Kennedy-Nixon) ... 185,000 N:141 K:115 -256 -0.14
Mass. gubenatorial,
1962 (Peabody-
Volpe) ............ 2,109,000 P:252 P:3,091 + 2,839 + 0.13
Minn. gubenatorial,
1962 (Rolvaag-
Anderson) .......... 1,247,000 R:276 R:91 -185 -0.015
Oregon senatorial,
1968 (Packwood-
Morse) ............. 814,000 P:3,445 P:3,263 -182 -0.023
S. Dakota senatorial,
1962 (McGovern-
Bottum) ........... 254,000 M:271 M:516 + 245 + 0.094
Total 4,609,000 ...................... + 2,461 + 0.53
If the average of all five races is taken, the net shift was 2,500 votes in five elections
in which 4.6 million people cast ballots, a shift of 5/100ths of one percent.
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system, who has changed the electoral vote count but re-
mains the loser in the popular vote.2 0
Minorities Would Not Lose Impact Under Direct Election
Some have defended the present electoral college approach on
the theory that the system as it operates gives disproportionate
voting influence to racial or ethnic minorities, thereby offsetting
some of the economic or social deprivations historically suffered by
these groups. The late Professor Alexander M. Bickel of Yale Law
School was a major proponent of this view. In hearings before the
Senate Judiciary Committee during a previous consideration of elec-
toral reform he stated,
The system is, therefore, in effect malapportioned in
favor of the large industrial states, in which party com-
petition is vigorous, and which generally swing by small
percentages of the popular vote. Not only that but the
system is in effect malapportioned in favor of cohesive in-
terest, ethnic or racial groups within these large states,
which often go nearly in block for a candidate, and can sw-
ing the state and its entire electoral vote.23
This view, however, is by no means universally held; various
statistical studies have tended to refute this contention. Sayre and
Parris,24 for example, believe that urban minority groups would lose
influence under a direct election system; an opinion shared by
Spilerman and Dickens. 5 The preponderance of analyses, however,
find evidence to the contrary." A recent study completed by
20. Hearings on S.J.Res.1, Before the Subcommittee on the Constitutional
Amendments, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., (Feb. 1, 1977) (statement by L. Kinvin Wroth,
University of Maine Law School).
21. Professor Wroth is convinced that the present Electoral Count Act poses a
problem of equal magnitude with that of the faithless elector or the winner-take-all
rule. See Wroth, Election Contests and the Electoral Vote, 65 DICK. L. REV. 321
(1961).
22. STAFF OF SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.,
REPORT ON DIRECT POPULAR ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT 29 (Comm. Print 1975).
23. Hearings on S.J.Res.1 on Direct Popular Election of the President, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 50 (1970).
24. W. SAYRE & J. PARRIS, VOTING FOR PRESIDENT: THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE
AND THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM (Brookings Institution, 1970).
25. Spilerman & Dickens, Who Will Gain and Who Will Lose Influence Under
Different Electoral Rules, 80 AM. J. Soc. 443 (1974).
26. See, ie., L. LONGLEY & A BRAUN, THE POLITICS OF ELECTORAL COLLEGE
REFORM (1972) [hereinafter cited as LONGLEY & BRAUN]; J. YUNKER & L. LONGLEY, THE
ELECTORAL COLLEGE: ITS BIASES NEWLY MEASURED FOR THE 1960's AND 1970's (1976);
H. ZEIDENSTEIN, DIRECT ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT (1973).
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Douglas H. Blair of the University of Pennsylvania, for example,
contends that this view is incorrect:
Still others have suggested that, while metropolitan
areas are indeed advantaged under the existing electoral
procedures, Bickel and Sayre and Parris have misiden-
tified the pivotal groups. In fact, as William J.D. Boyd has
suggested, it is the suburbs and not the central cities
which would lose power if direct election were instituted.
The empirical findings of this essay suggest that
suburban native whites, the most economically advantag-
ed of nine demographic groups also wield the most
political power in the selection of the president under
either of two power measures. They further indicate that
this power would be diminished by abolition of the elec-
toral college. Blacks, on the other hand, the least
economically advantaged of the groups, are shown to have
below average voting power under the electoral college
procedure according to each index; they would gain power
under direct election. It would seem to be no very
strenuous normative leap, for an egalitarian to the conclu-
sion that electoral reform is in order."
The belief that the electoral college system benefits racial or
ethnic minorities in large urban areas is heavily based on the
assumption that these population centers are located in heavily
populated states and that Presidential candidates are attracted to
these areas because they command large numbers of electoral votes.
This "advantage" of the present system over a direct election
system, however, is more illusory than real. While it is, of course,
correct that large states are more politically powerful because they
can deliver more electoral votes, it is also evident that under a
direct election approach, areas of the country with large populations
will continue to draw significant candidate attention simply because
of the greater number of potential voters gathered there.
Certainly, any advantage the electoral college system may
have for ethnic or racial groups concentrated in large industrial
states, is outweighed by the unit rule provision. This system, which
awards all of a state's electoral votes to the candidate who wins a
majority of the popular vote, can have an impact on minority voting
27. PEIRCE at 282-283.
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strength that is little short of devastating. The rule can, in effect,
obliterate the minority vote completely. For example, although 9 5%
of the black voters in Indiana supported President Carter in the
1976 general election, these votes, in a very real sense, were
wasted. Because Ford succeeded in gaining a majority of the popular
vote and was awarded all 13 of the State's electoral votes, the great
majority of the black voters' preference could not be recorded.
This is particularly devastating to ethnic or racial minorities
which often share common political goals and interests throughout
the country. Under the present electoral college system, their votes
are "washed out" in unsuccessful winner-take-all state by state con-
tests rather than being pooled with other ethnic or minority group
votes as would be possible under a direct election system. As Neal
R. Pierce has noted on the question of whether ethnic or minority
group members would lose voting power under a direct election
system,
The answer is clearly no .... They would be able to
transfer their voting strength to the national stage in-
stead-and be just as effective there .... Negroes from
Southern States like Georgia and Alabama would be able
to combine their Presidential votes with Negroes from
New York, Illinois and Michigan and thus constitute a for-
midable national voting bloc that the parties would ignore
at their peril."
Similarly, even when minority and ethnic group voters support
the winning candidate in a particular state they also may find
numbers of their votes "wasted." For example, the Joint Center for
Political Studies estimates that in the 1976 election, blacks cast
some 298,000 votes for President Carter in Pennsylvania. However,
since Carter beat Ford in that state by 123,372 votes there is a valid
argument to be made that 174,628 of the black votes had absolutely
no effect on the election on a national level. These votes therefore
are essentially meaningless since they were unnecessary for the
needed majority to carry the State and to capture the electoral
votes.
Direct Election Will Not Weaken The Two-Party System
Another of the serious charges leveled at the direct election
amendment is that substitution of direct election for the electoral
28. V. KEY, PARTIES AND PRESSURE GROUPS 209 (5th ed. 1964). See also
LONGLEY & BRAUN at 88-90.
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college will destroy the two-party system. This objection centers
around two perceived threats: 1) the prospect that direct election
will weaken the system and the structures of the two existing par-
ties; 2) the fear that direct election will encourage minor party can-
didates who will fragment and eventually destroy the two-party
system.
The first question to be asked in addressing this criticism is
what in the American scheme of political life has caused the two-
party system. Is the electoral college an integral part of the solid
political structure we have built? Many theories for our two-party
system have been advanced by political scientists. Few contend that
the electoral college has been responsible for the two-party system
or even plays an essential role in our party system. The broadest
consensus clusters around one goal which encourages and
strengthens the information of the two major parties: the single in-
divisible office of the Presidency. Since the presidency itself is a
winner-take-all office in which the victor need not share power with
any of the other candidates, there will always be an incentive for
smaller parties to amalgamate with larger parties in order to have a
modicum of control over the policies of the party in office. V. 0.
Key, a prominent political scientist, expressed the concept:
The Presidency, unlike a multiparty cabinet, cannot
be parceled out among miniscule parties. The cir-
cumstances stimulate coalition within the electorate
before the election rather than in parliament after the
popular vote. Since no more than two parties can for long
compete effectively for the Presidency, two contending
groups tend to develop, each built on its constituent units
in each of the 50 states.'
Several other broad theories explaining our unique party
system should also be mentioned. The first is that general forces or
aspects of American society have mitigated against large and effec-
tive dissenting groups. The very successes of American economy
and the unity of the people have worked to thwart radical political
efforts. "[Socialism] foundered long ago, as Werner Sombart remark-
ed despairingly, 'on the shoals of roast beef and apple pie.'
30
Akin to this concept is the theme of Allan Sindler, that
underlying the nation is a broad consensus, a willingness to accept
29. C. ROSSITER, PARTIES AND POLITICS IN AMERICA 8 (1962).
30. SINDLER, POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE UNITED STATES 53-54 (1966).
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political disagreement." The South of not long ago, on the other
hand, is given as an example of a region too united in its political
views. "The continuance of stable and moderate two-party systems
depends upon a happy balance struck between consensus and con-
flict."32
Other-theorists point to our system of electing single represen-
tatives as the foundation for two parties.3 What these scholars see
is a magnifying effect built into the single-member district in which
the winning party is able to acquire more seats per number of votes,
the greater the percent of total vote the party can win. Success in
winning votes across the country in effect inflates the relative
power of the winning party. The converse is also true: The less
successful the losing party, the more votes it will take to elect a
representative. Major parties do not disappear, however, because
they are liable to remain strong regionally or in certain kinds of
areas. That the effect is devastating on minor parties, however, is
borne out by the fact that minor parties have not held more than
two of the U.S. House seats since 1944.
34
In the Senate debates on S.J. Res. 1, the direct election amend-
ment, great concern was voiced over the weakening of the state par-
ty structures should the amendment be accepted. The answer to this
concern is that abolition of the electoral college will not weaken the
structure of the existing national parties in that there is very little
actual national structure of the two major parties to destroy. Many
question the extent to which the two major parties now operate on
a truly national level. When one of the parties is out of office, its na-
tional base is little more than a coalition of strong state parties.
When the party is in office, its national organization is directed by
officers effectively selected by the candidate, more according to his
preferences than to any national party ideology. Many assert that it
is the strong state and local parties which account for whatever
strength the national parties can claim. Since these state and local
parties are organized around the election of state and local officials,
there is no reason to assume direct election will have any impact on
them.
The second objective to direct election centers around the
alleged tendency of direct popular election to encourage prolifera-
31. Id. at 57.
32. See, e.g., E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, PARTY GOVERNMENT (1960).
33. PEIRCE at 260.
34. LONGLEY & BRAUN at 130.
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tion of their parties. Again, the first counter to this objection is to
point to the manner in which the electoral college itself operates. It
has been convincingly argued by many that it is the electoral college
which provides fertile ground for minor party candidates. Larry
Longley among others has pointed out that the electoral college
engenders third parties in two respects." First, it provides incen-
tives for a regional third party candidate such as George Wallace,
by viture of the possibility of carrying a bloc of states with a thin
margin, and thereby throwing the two major candidates into a
deadlock in the House of Representatives.
In addition to the threat of deadlock, one must also take into
account the crucial role played by minor party candidates within the
states representing large numbers of electoral votes." Even if an
ideologically based third-party candidate cannot possibly hope to
win the popular majority (and thus the electoral votes) of any given
state, his supporters may always detract from one major party can-
didate a sufficient number of popular votes to swing the state to the
opposing major party candidate. Thus, the minor party candidate,
while receiving no electoral votes of his own with which to bargain,
holds the reins over all the electoral votes in any state in which the
major party candidate's margin of victory is less than or equal to
the minor party candidate's percentage of the popular vote.
A major argument in support of the hypothesis that direct elec-
tion will lead to the proliferation of parties and the eventual
destruction of the two-party system, centers on the provision of
S.J. Res. 1 calling for a run-off in the event none of the candidates
receives at least 40% of the popular vote. Critics of direct election
claim that a minor party candidate or coalition of candidates can ef-
fectively control the outcome of the election, either by selling their
votes to one of the major party candidates before the election, or by
forcing a run-off and then using their percentage of supporters won
in the initial election to bargain for concessions from the two can-
didates remaining in the run-off. There are several flaws in this line
of reasoning.
First, it must be kept in mind that a third party would
necessarily have at least twenty percent of the vote. In the event
that each of the major party candidates receives just less than 40%
of the popular vote, a 20% vote for a minor party candidate or a
group of candidates will prove determinative in forcing a run-off.
35. The campaign of Eugene McCarthy in 1976 is an example of this.
36. LONGLEY & BRAUN at 4.
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However, merely amassing 20% of the popular vote (no small feat
for minor party candidates) will not be sufficient to compel a run-off
without simultaneously preventing either of the major party can-
didates from receiving at least 40% of the vote. Thus, the minor
party candidate who hopes to spoil an election by securing a good
bargaining position or by forcing a run-off, must do more than
siphon off a considerable number of votes; he must siphon them off
srom both parties.
Assuming, however, that a minor party candidate or group of
candidates is able to garner 20% of the popular vote and
simultaneously preclude either major party candidate from receiving
at least 40% of the remaining votes, the bargaining position obtain-
ed may be less than would at first appear. The ability of the can-
didate to control the votes of all those individuals who once claimed
to support him is not tantamount to the influence held by a can-
didate over electors pledged to him. Thus, it is unlikely that a minor
party candidate will be able to deliver all the votes of his sup-
porters, even if he endorses one of the major party candidates.
Moreover, once the 2 0% ceases to represent a unified coalition, the
bargaining power of the minor party candidates decreases substan-
tially.
CONCLUSION
Direct national election was first proposed in Congress on
March 20, 1816 by Senator Abner Lacock of Pennsylvania. 7 Perhaps
not surprisingly, the arguments heard against it that day have
echoed down to the present. There were warnings of loss of the
balance of power in the Confederacy, of too great a disparity bet-
ween voting qualifications in the different states, interminable
delays in counting, and finally, weakening of the federal system.
Lacock ultimately took his place as the first sponsor of a direct elec-
tion amendment to lose the battle.
Few of us would disagree on its face with the statement of
Alexander Bickel echoing the great Edmund Burke:
There are great virtues in a conservative attitude
towards structural features of government. The sudden
abandonment of institutions is an act that reverberates in
ways no one can predict and many come to regret. 8
37. 29 ANNALS OF CONG. 220 (1816).
38. Comment, New Republic 5, 8 (May 7, 1977).
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As applied toward the direct election amendment, however, it is in-
appropriate. The idea of reforming our antiquated electoral
mechanism has never been a "liberal" or "conservative" one. Sup-
port has always been bi-partisan, and inclusive of widely differing
political philosophies. "Conservative" as employed by Mr. Bickel
reflects merely an unfocused fear of change. It also at times reflects
a certain perceived interest in maintaining things as they are.
Hopefully, this article has made clear that the effects of adop-
tion of direct election are in great part predictable, and in few ways
regrettable. Certainly after 160 years or more of consideration no
one can accuse the proposed amendment of being "sudden." Senator
Lacock asked: "What could make us so much one people, as to give
to all the people this equal privilege?"39 It is still a timely and valid
question.
39. 29 ANNALS OF CONG. 220 (1816).
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